Civil War

Congressman Eldredge Defends Free Speech

The free speech debate between war supporters and war critics came to a head in April, 1864 during a debate in the U.S. House of Representatives over a proposal to pass a constitutional amendment banning slavery. A Democratic Congressman from Ohio, Mr. Long, maintained that the war was destroying constitutional liberties and the nation’s morals and that only the Peace Democrats could restore the Union.1 In response, the House Republicans proposed a resolution to expel Mr. Long from the Congress.2 In simpler words, they wanted to kick him out because they disagreed with his opinions.

This is where Congressman Charles Augustus Eldredge, a Democrat from Fond du Lac, Wisconsin, comes into the picture. Eldredge, like many Wisconsinites of the period, was a Yankee who migrated to the Badger State to pursue his dreams. Born in Vermont February 27, 1820, he moved with his parents to New York in 1825, attended the common schools and studied law. He began his legal practice in 1846 in Canton, New York but moved two years later to Fond du Lac. He was elected to the State senate 1854-1856 and the U.S. Congress from 1863-1875. He resumed his legal practice and died in Fond du Lac October 26, 1896.3

On April 12, 1864, Mr. Eldredge stood before the United States Congress and made an impassioned speech on behalf of free speech.4 Although he did not share Long’s opinions about the war, he stood up to defend Mr. Long’s right to express his opinions and his right to criticize the government, even during a difficult war. Now why would Congressman Eldredge do that? Why would he defend someone he thought was wrong? Let us see.

Eldredge begins: “The resolution to expel the gentlemen from Ohio for opinions…expressed in debate on the floor of this House, in my judgment presents one of the most important questions ever presented here or in any other deliberative body because it involves the sacred right to free speech in general, and the right of parliamentary debate.”

Eldredge continues: The resolution is wrong first of all because “there is no constitutional warrant for this proceeding.” “The right to membership [in the House] is does not depend upon the opinion that may or may not be entertained. The power [of the Congress]…to punish or expel is for disorderly behavior only.” “The doctrine that we can expel a member for the opinions he entertains is monstrous.” “It is acts, ‘disorderly behavior,’ and not the expression of opinion, for which this house may expel or punish.” Now, Mr. Davis of Maryland claimed last night that this particular speech was not merely an opinion, it was a “judgment formed and delivered.” But “[i]t is difficult to perceive the distinction between opinion and judgment in this instance.” Both are spoken words that may or may not offend someone. Neither is an action of disorderly conduct.

Eldredge: “[T]his question rises infinitely higher than the right or wrong of the opinions themselves. It involves the whole question of the right of minorities to representation…” The resolution violates Mr. Long’s duty to represent his constituents, many of whom share the opinions he expressed during a debate. As a Congressman, “it was his solemn duty to bring the subject before this House and present it to the country. This is a Government of the people, and they are entitled to the information.” “Members are sent here to represent different views and opinions.”

Eldredge: The resolution also violates Mr. Long’s “liberty of conscience.” Our forefathers included the protection of free speech in the Bill of Rights because of their experience with British censorship. They also repealed the Sedition Act of 1798 when they understood how it wrongfully intruded into matters of individual conscience. The great Daniel Webster himself insisted that the right to free speech exists both in peacetime and in war and requires us to be courteous and temperate in its use, except when the right itself is questioned. Why? Because it is a “homebred right, a fireside privilege” which “hath been enjoyed in every house, every cottage and cabin in the nation,” “as undoubted as the right of breathing air, or walking on the earth.”

Eldredge: We also should reject the resolution because the truth will prevail in a contest against falsehood. “If the opinions of the gentleman from Ohio are so clearly and flagrantly wrong, where is the danger? Who fears that the truth will not prevail?” “Wrong and oppression would shrink from a fair, open, and manly warfare.” As President Thomas Jefferson proclaimed in his message to Congress, “having banished from our land that religious intolerance, under which mankind so long bled and suffered, we have yet gained little if we countenance a political intolerance as despotic, as wicked, and capable of as bitter and bloody persecutions.” Thus we should try to educate those whom we believe hold false opinions rather than try to punish them.

Eldredge concludes: Finally, the resolution should be rejected because it is hypocritical. Republicans such as Mr. Conway of Kansas, Mr. Washburne of Illinois, Mr. Stevens of Pennsylvania, even Mr. Walker of President Lincoln’s own administration, have expressed similar and even worse opinions about the war, but we don’t see any resolutions being proposed against them. But Mr. Long, a Democrat, says it, and the Republicans are quick to condemn.5 “Where is [the] consistency?” This blatant pursuit of party interests shows disregard for both law and morals. “Some of the Republican papers in the country are frank and manly enough to see and declare the folly of this farce. The New York Times of yesterday, which I hold in my hand declares the resolution ‘…neither right nor expedient.’ The New York Evening Post …says, ‘Mr. Long’s [speech] was a perfectly legitimate expression of opinion.’ In summation, we should “[r]espect the rights, the intelligence, the sovereignty of the people….[s]tifle not the voice of their Representatives….[l[et this Hall resound with free debate where truth and not force shall overthrow error, where reason and not power shall bear sway.”

This powerful speech, along with other speeches and newspaper columns defending Mr. Long’s right to free speech,6 led to the failure of the resolution (which required a two-thirds majority) and forced the Republicans to settle for censure in a party-line vote (which only required a simple majority vote).7

Notes

1 See, e.g., Klement (1972), p. 229.

2 Long was immediately showered with “invective and abuse” by House Republicans and “chaos reigned as rivals tried to outshout each other.” When Benjamin Harris of Maryland and Fernando Wood of New York stood to defend Long, it was moved to expel them too. Klement (1972), pp. 229-30.

3 Biographical Directory of the United State Congress, http://bioguide.congress.gov/

4 The Congressional Globe 1863 (1863) pp. 1577-1578.

5 Long, in his original speech made the point that the views he was expressing were shared by some Republican politicians and newspapers, including the Cincinnati Commercial, New York Tribune, Indianapolis Journal, Chicago Tribune, New Haven Palladium, Columbus Journal, and Salmon P. Chase, Lincoln’s Secretary of the Treasury. Congressional Globe (1864), April 18, p. 1501.

6 Four other Democrats spoke against the resolution (in printed order): Kernan (NY), p. 1549; Finck (OH), pp. 1552-4; Pendleton (--), pp. 1585-6; and Rogers (NJ), pp. 1619-21. See Curtis, pp. 343-348.

7 Klement (1972), pp. 229-230. To censure is to rebuke or criticize in an official capacity.